commit 7c47a6b15782b13ecb76fd3c6c18e5f1edc34733 [browse]
Author: Gopher Robot
Date: 2023-04-04 17:05:20 Z

[release-branch.go1.20] go1.20.3

Change-Id: I1ca3074262203c6f250c902ca087d244edf9eb96
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/482097
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commit 20374d1d759bc4e17486bde1cb9dca5be37d9e52 [browse]
Author: Roland Shoemaker
Date: 2023-03-20 11:01:13 -07:00

[release-branch.go1.20] html/template: disallow actions in JS template literals

ECMAScript 6 introduced template literals[0][1] which are delimited with
backticks. These need to be escaped in a similar fashion to the
delimiters for other string literals. Additionally template literals can
contain special syntax for string interpolation.

There is no clear way to allow safe insertion of actions within JS
template literals, as handling (JS) string interpolation inside of these
literals is rather complex. As such we've chosen to simply disallow
template actions within these template literals.

A new error code is added for this parsing failure case, errJsTmplLit,
but it is unexported as it is not backwards compatible with other minor
release versions to introduce an API change in a minor release. We will
export this code in the next major release.

The previous behavior (with the cavet that backticks are now escaped
properly) can be re-enabled with GODEBUG=jstmpllitinterp=1.

This change subsumes CL471455.

Thanks to Sohom Datta, Manipal Institute of Technology, for reporting
this issue.

Fixes CVE-2023-24538
For #59234
Fixes #59272

[0] https://tc39.es/ecma262/multipage/ecmascript-language-expressions.html#sec-template-literals
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Template_literals

Change-Id: Idff74ec386e9b73d6e9a3c9f71990eabc0ce7506
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1802457
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1802688
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/481993
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Auto-Submit: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>

commit e7c4b07ecf6b367f1afc9cc48cde963829dd0aab [browse]
Author: Damien Neil
Date: 2023-03-22 09:33:22 -07:00

[release-branch.go1.20] go/scanner: reject large line and column numbers in //line directives

Setting a large line or column number using a //line directive can cause
integer overflow even in small source files.

Limit line and column numbers in //line directives to 2^30-1, which
is small enough to avoid int32 overflow on all reasonbly-sized files.

Fixes CVE-2023-24537
For #59180
Fixes #59274

Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1802456
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib9c5cb38428ed34ab129d451b00a2998e72c861c
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1802401
TryBot-Result: Security TryBots <security-trybots@go-security-trybots.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
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commit bf8c7c575c8a552d9d79deb29e80854dc88528d0 [browse]
Author: Damien Neil
Date: 2023-03-20 10:43:19 -07:00

[release-branch.go1.20] mime/multipart: limit parsed mime message sizes

The parsed forms of MIME headers and multipart forms can consume
substantially more memory than the size of the input data.
A malicious input containing a very large number of headers or
form parts can cause excessively large memory allocations.

Set limits on the size of MIME data:

Reader.NextPart and Reader.NextRawPart limit the the number
of headers in a part to 10000.

Reader.ReadForm limits the total number of headers in all
FileHeaders to 10000.

Both of these limits may be set with with
GODEBUG=multipartmaxheaders=<values>.

Reader.ReadForm limits the number of parts in a form to 1000.
This limit may be set with GODEBUG=multipartmaxparts=<value>.

Thanks for Jakob Ackermann (@das7pad) for reporting this issue.

For CVE-2023-24536
For #59153
For #59270

Change-Id: I36ddceead7f8292c327286fd8694e6113d3b4977
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1802455
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1802608
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/481991
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commit ec18f62df59d8f857e63ed3d7480754c49b072c3 [browse]
Author: Damien Neil
Date: 2023-03-16 16:56:12 -07:00

[release-branch.go1.20] net/textproto, mime/multipart: improve accounting of non-file data

For requests containing large numbers of small parts,
memory consumption of a parsed form could be about 250%
over the estimated size.

When considering the size of parsed forms, account for the size of
FileHeader structs and increase the estimate of memory consumed by
map entries.

Thanks to Jakob Ackermann (@das7pad) for reporting this issue.

For CVE-2023-24536
For #59153
For #59270

Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1802454
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
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Change-Id: I9753aa1f8a1b1479c160f870def3b7081b6847ac
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1802399
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