commit 8dff6466cd8680845db95cbbc556ab69addd8c4b [browse]
Author: Sergey Matveev
Date: 2025-01-17 12:05:28 +03:00

Autogenerated TLS-related strings

go install golang.org/x/tools/cmd/stringer@latest
cd src/crypto/tls ; go generate

commit 790ca5e491064be8537d53603920005113d28e01 [browse]
Author: Sergey Matveev
Date: 2023-02-02 00:19:57 +03:00

GOST X.509 and TLS 1.3 support via GoGOST

commit d04e3cbc9240e25de449dcae2ec33d03062f347b [browse]
Author: Gopher Robot
Date: 2025-01-16 11:41:53 -08:00

[release-branch.go1.23] go1.23.5

Change-Id: I849328cf93adf24c223f103f5b834635970ea652
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/643137
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>

commit bb8230f80535945648e8b56739ad450cf433eba9 [browse]
Author: Damien Neil
Date: 2024-11-22 12:34:11 -08:00

[release-branch.go1.23] net/http: persist header stripping across repeated redirects

When an HTTP redirect changes the host of a request, we drop
sensitive headers such as Authorization from the redirected request.
Fix a bug where a chain of redirects could result in sensitive
headers being sent to the wrong host:

  1. request to a.tld with Authorization header
  2. a.tld redirects to b.tld
  3. request to b.tld with no Authorization header
  4. b.tld redirects to b.tld
  3. request to b.tld with Authorization header restored

Thanks to Kyle Seely for reporting this issue.

For #70530
Fixes ##71211
Fixes CVE-2024-45336

Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/1641
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Change-Id: I326544358de71ff892d9e9fe338252a5dd04001f
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/1764
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/643104
Auto-Submit: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>

commit fdb8413fe588ec6dc31f1deaf43eb7202a76bb79 [browse]
Author: Roland Shoemaker
Date: 2024-12-09 11:31:22 -08:00

[release-branch.go1.23] crypto/x509: properly check for IPv6 hosts in URIs

When checking URI constraints, use netip.ParseAddr, which understands
zones, unlike net.ParseIP which chokes on them. This prevents zone IDs
from mistakenly satisfying URI constraints.

Thanks to Juho Forsén of Mattermost for reporting this issue.

For #71156
Fixes #71208
Fixes CVE-2024-45341

Change-Id: Iecac2529f3605382d257996e0fb6d6983547e400
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/1700
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 22ca55d396ba801e6ae9b2bd67a059fcb30562fd)
Reviewed-on: https://go-internal-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/1762
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/643103
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>